SameSite cookies explained
{% Aside %}
This article is part of a series on the SameSite cookie attribute changes that includes:
The introduction of the SameSite attribute (defined in
RFC6265bis)
allows you to declare if your cookie should be restricted to a first-party or
same-site context. It's helpful to understand exactly what 'site' means here.
The site is the combination of the domain suffix and the part of the domain just
before it. For example, the www.web.dev domain is part of the web.dev site.
{% Aside 'key-term' %}
If the user is on www.web.dev and requests an image from static.web.dev then
that is a same-site request.
{% endAside %}
The public suffix list defines this, so it's not
just top-level domains like .com but also includes services like github.io.
That enables your-project.github.io and my-project.github.io to count as
separate sites.
{% Aside 'key-term' %}
If the user is on your-project.github.io and requests an image from
my-project.github.io that's a cross-site request.
{% endAside %}
Explicitly state cookie usage with the SameSite attribute
Introducing the SameSite attribute on a cookie provides three different ways
to control this behaviour. You can choose to not specify the attribute, or you
can use Strict or Lax to limit the cookie to same-site requests.
If you set SameSite to Strict, your cookie will only be sent in a
first-party context. In user terms, the cookie will only be sent if the site for
the cookie matches the site currently shown in the browser's URL bar. So, if the
promo_shown cookie is set as follows:
Set-Cookie: promo_shown=1; SameSite=Strict
When the user is on your site, then the cookie will be sent with the request as
expected. However when following a link into your site, say from another site or
via an email from a friend, on that initial request the cookie will not be sent.
This is good when you have cookies relating to functionality that will always
be behind an initial navigation, such as changing a password or making a
purchase, but is too restrictive for promo_shown. If your reader follows the
link into the site, they want the cookie sent so their preference can be
applied.
That's where SameSite=Lax comes in by allowing the cookie to be sent with
these top-level navigations. Let's revisit the cat article example from above
where another site is referencing your content. They make use of your photo of
the cat directly and provide a link through to your original article.
<p>Look at this amazing cat!</p>
<img src="https://blog.example/blog/img/amazing-cat.png" />
<p>Read the <a href="https://blog.example/blog/cat.html">article</a>.</p>
Set-Cookie: promo_shown=1; SameSite=Lax
When the reader is on the other person's blog the cookie will not be sent
when the browser requests amazing-cat.png. However when the reader follows the
link through to cat.html on your blog, that request will include the
cookie. This makes Lax a good choice for cookies affecting the display of the
site with Strict being useful for cookies related to actions your user is
taking.
{% Aside 'caution' %}
Neither Strict nor Lax are a complete solution for your site's security.
Cookies are sent as part of the user's request and you should treat them the
same as any other user input. That means sanitizing and validating the input.
Never use a cookie to store data you consider a server-side secret.
{% endAside %}
Finally there is the option of not specifying the value which has previously
been the way of implicitly stating that you want the cookie to be sent in all
contexts. In the latest draft of
RFC6265bis this
is being made explicit by introducing a new value of SameSite=None. This means
you can use None to clearly communicate that you intentionally want the cookie
sent in a third-party context.
None, Lax, or Strict.
{% Aside %}
If you provide a service that other sites consume such as widgets, embedded
content, affiliate programs, advertising, or sign-in across multiple sites
then you should use None to ensure your intent is clear.
{% endAside %}
Changes to the default behavior without SameSite
While the SameSite attribute is widely supported, it has unfortunately not
been widely adopted by developers. The open default of sending cookies
everywhere means all use cases work but leaves the user vulnerable to CSRF and
unintentional information leakage. To encourage developers to state their intent
and provide users with a safer experience, the IETF proposal,
Incrementally Better Cookies
lays out two key changes:
Chrome implements this default behavior as of version 84.
Firefox
has them available to test as of Firefox 69 and will make them default behaviors
in the future. To test these behaviors in Firefox, open
about:config and set
network.cookie.sameSite.laxByDefault.
Edge
also plans to change its default behaviors.
{% Aside %}
This article will be updated as additional browsers announce support.
{% endAside %}
SameSite=Lax by default
{% Compare 'worse', 'No attribute set' %}
Set-Cookie: promo_shown=1
{% CompareCaption %}
{% endCompareCaption %}
{% endCompare %}
{% Compare 'better', 'Default behavior applied' %}
Set-Cookie: promo_shown=1; SameSite=Lax
{% CompareCaption %}
The browser will treat that cookie as if SameSite=Lax was specified.
{% endCompareCaption %}
{% endCompare %}
While this is intended to apply a more secure default, you should ideally set an
explicit SameSite attribute rather than relying on the browser to apply that
for you. This makes your intent for the cookie explicit and improves the chances
of a consistent experience across browsers.
{% Aside 'caution' %}
The default behaviour applied by Chrome is slightly more permissive than an
explicit SameSite=Lax as it will allow certain cookies to be sent on top-level
POST requests. You can see the exact details on
the blink-dev announcement.
This is intended as a temporary mitigation, you should still be fixing your
cross-site cookies to use SameSite=None; Secure.
{% endAside %}
SameSite=None must be secure
{% Compare 'worse', 'Rejected' %}
Set-Cookie: widget_session=abc123; SameSite=None
{% CompareCaption %}
{% endCompareCaption %}
{% endCompare %}
{% Compare 'better', 'Accepted' %}
Set-Cookie: widget_session=abc123; SameSite=None; Secure
{% CompareCaption %}
You must ensure that you pair SameSite=None with the Secure attribute.
{% endCompareCaption %}
{% endCompare %}
You can test this behavior as of Chrome 76 by enabling
about://flags/#cookies-without-same-site-must-be-secure and from Firefox 69
in about:config by setting
network.cookie.sameSite.noneRequiresSecure.
You will want to apply this when setting new cookies and actively refresh existing cookies even if they are not approaching their expiry date.
{% Aside 'note' %}
If you rely on any services that provide third-party content on your site, you should also check with the provider that they are updating their services. You may need to update your dependencies or snippets to ensure that your site picks up the new behavior.
{% endAside %}
Both of these changes are backwards-compatible with browsers that have correctly
implemented the previous version of the SameSite attribute, or just do not
support it at all. By applying these changes to your cookies, you are making
their intended use explicit rather than relying on the default behavior of the
browser. Likewise, any clients that do not recognize SameSite=None as of yet
should ignore it and carry on as if the attribute was not set.
{% Aside 'warning' %}
A number of older versions of browsers including Chrome, Safari, and UC browser
are incompatible with the new None attribute and may ignore or restrict the
cookie. This behavior is fixed in current versions, but you should check your
traffic to determine what proportion of your users are affected. You can see the
list of known incompatible clients on the Chromium site.
{% endAside %}
SameSite cookie recipes
For further detail on exactly how to update your cookies to successfully handle
these changes to SameSite=None and the difference in browser behavior, head to
the follow up article, SameSite cookie recipes.
Kind thanks for contributions and feedback from Lily Chen, Malte Ubl, Mike West, Rob Dodson, Tom Steiner, and Vivek Sekhar
谢谢你的反馈！